Abstract-Internet attacks are evolving using evasion tech niques such as polymorphism and stealth scanning. Conven tional detection systems using signature-based and/or rule based anomaly detection techniques no longer suffice. It is dif ficult to predict what form the next malware attack will take and these pose a great challenge to the design of a robust intru sion detection system. We focus on the anomalous behavioral characteristics between attack and victim when they undergo sequences of compromising actions and that are inherent to the classes of vulnerability-exploit attacks. A new approach, Ges talt, is proposed to statefully capture and monitor activities between hosts and progressively assess possible network ano malies by multilevel behavior tracking, cross-level triggering and correlation, and a probabilistic inference model is pro posed for intrusion assessment and detection. Such multilevel design provides a collective perspective to reveal more anoma lies than individual levels. We show that Gestalt is robust and effective in detecting polymorphic, stealthy variants of known attacks.
INTRODUCTION
Internet attacks involve continuously evolving evasion techniques, such as polymorphism and stealthy scanning. Consequently, conventional detection systems that use a combination of signature-based and/or rule-based anomaly detection techniques no longer offer sufficient protection. Moreover, it is difficult to predict what form or strategy the next malware attack will take, which poses a great challenge to the design of a robust intrusion detection system. In this paper, behavior profiling has been proposed as a means of identifying malware attack. In traditional criminal investiga tions, profiling refers to the use of specific characteristics, such as gender and age, to make generalizations about a per son to identify that he or she may be engaged in an illegal activity [1] . In cyberspace security, the key issue in profiling is how to identify the distinctive characteristics of attacks that are robust and can be manipulated to prevent further intrusions, especially stealthy and unknown attacks.
In the literature [2] , intrusion detection techniques were generally classified into different approaches. Most works on profiling or fingerprinting focused on content-based signa tures, which capture an attack ' s characteristics by deriving the most representative content sequence from the attack packets. Signature-based techniques are most commonly 978-1-4244-5849-3/10/$26.00 ©2010 IEEE 165 used for the detection of known attacks (e.g., Snort [3] ). However, these methods cannot detect unknown attacks, and they may not be effective for variations of known attacks like polymorphic attacks. In addition, automatically generating and distributing signatures (e.g., EarlyBird and Polygraph in [2] ) for new attacks remains an open research issue.
Anomaly detection overcomes the limitation of signa ture-based detection techniques by focusing on normal beha vior. Typically, normal behavior are observed and characte rized to find the presence of attacks. Machine learning and statistical analysis techniques are often used to create a pro file of the normal behavior, and any deviation from the nor mal behavior profile is flagged as a potential attacks. In the past, most network-based anomaly detection works focused on profiling contact behavior to detect network abnormalities, e.g., a large volume of traffic generated by scanning, the high rate of failure connection attempts, or the epidemic spreading phenomenon of a worm infection [4] - [6] . There are also works focus on host-based program execution profiling [19] . Different from them, we focus on network service execution behavior as a basis to profile a network activity.
While current detection methods are only effective for specific attacks and certain assumptions under consideration (e.g., a tree-structure in rapidly spreading worm attacks), future sophisticated attacks could try to evade them. For ex ample, attacks may adopt stealthy probing and scanning strategies to evade traffic-based detection techniques [7] . Polymorphic attacks that mutate to change the payload across attack instances can evade signature-based detection techniques. Detection techniques also face the challenge of detecting new, unknown attacks. Clearly, we need robust and effective detection techniques against future attacks.
A number of works (e.g., [2] , [8] , and [9] ) have demon strated the effectiveness of using behavioral patterns to detect classes of unseen worms that possess epidemic propa gation characteristics. In [8] , the authors studied the inter machine propagation pattern exhibited by worms and identi fied three behavior patterns: "Server Changes to Client", "a in-a-out", and an inductive relationship. We consider these relationship or epidemic propagation could be easily evaded by using certain sophisticated, stealthy techniques, such as those described in [7] . In [9] , a unique temporal sequence of message exchange is used as a behavioral footprint to detect known worms that repeats an identical attack procedure as they propagate. Although these methods may detect poly morphic attacks, they are only suitable for detecting known attacks. Moreover, these behavior patterns are mostly ma nually constructed by security experts, such as in [10], [13] , and [17] , and developing high quality pattern is not easy.
To confront the future unknown attacks, we propose a profiling mechanism to capture the deviated behavior of at tacker ' s underlying protocol executions collectively while it undergoes the vulnerability exploitation. We point out that more anomalies can be revealed by our multilevel (i.e., transport, service, and attack symptom level) design and the proposed probabilistic inference model can decreased the false positive of anomaly-based detection technique.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the concept of behavior profiling and an example of attack Blaster to illustrate our main observation and idea. In Section 3, we present the framework to profile the attack behavior using a multilevel behavior tracking ap proach. The probabilistic inference model is also proposed in this section. In Section 4, the detail steps of how to construct the multilevel behavior profile is described. In Section 5, we demonstrate the experiment result of our system, Gestalt with different attacks and their variants. Finally, we conclud� our work in the last section.
II.

BEHAVIOR PROFILING
Instead of looking for the characteristic behavioral pat terns of an infected host in the scanning or spreading phases, we focus on behavior in compromising phase. Specifically, we focus on the anomalous behavioral characteristics exhi bited by the attacker and the victim hosts when they undergo sequences of activities to exploit the network service vulne rability. Class attacks, especially for non-human involved attacks, such as worm, botnet, operating fingerprinting [20] , and vulnerability probing are in our scope. We refer to these distinctive anomalous behavior characteristics as behavior 466 signatures. To avoid detection by a behavior signature, an attack must change its fundamental behavior. However, it is a challenge to modifY such vulnerability-exploit behavior.
The execution of a network application or service is es sentially a communication between distributed hosts employ ing certain network protocols and service modules. To progress vulnerability exploitation over the network, an at tack often causes problems that disrupt the execution of the vulnerable service. In other words, certain behavior that de viates from the normal execution of the underlying protocols and services (called de viated behavior hereafter) can be ex pected when a server is under attack. Although most existing transport protocols and services have already implemented routines to handle and respond to unexpected inputs, yet there are still certain malicious inputs cannot be correctly handled. The state of service execution may become unde termined and the server process may hang to time out due to unexpected input. For instance, in the class of buffer overflow attacks, the server process often "hangs" after be ing buffer overflowed, since it can neither respond to, nor send, messages as a normal server. This also causes the un derlying TCP connection to time out. Subsequently, the sys tem kernel undergoes a cleanup of the data structures asso ciated with the connection. Thereafter, any packets ex changed on the connection are considered "non-legitimate" by both the attacker and the victim hosts. Such abnormal sequences of message exchange and the "hanging" situation can be identified by monitoring the execution contexts of the protocols and services. Fig. 1 shows the deviated execution paths exhibited be tween the attacker and the victim hosts in Blaster. Three ses sions are established in the attack: the RPC session, which exploits the buffer overflow vulnerability of the RPC pro gram; the remote command session, which runs on top of a TCP connection for the attacker to send remote control commands to the victim; and a TFTP session (which is not shown in Fig. 1 ) initiated by the victim to download a mali cious file from the attacker. The state transition diagrams of the protocols and services are depicted in the figure. In each diagram, we show the normal (i.e., most frequent) execution paths and the paths taken by Blaster. Two obvious deviated behavior patterns can be identified in the RPC session. The first occurs when the attacker sends RPC messages in the wrong order, and the second is evident when the attacker terminates the TCP connection while the RPC session is still in a non-CLOSE state. The latter is a forced session termina tion that can be observed by cross-checking the RPC and TCP executions. These activities are not expected in normal invoca�ions of RPC and TCP. Another uncommon activity is noted III the remote command session when the underlying TCP connection is terminated with an RST flag rather the usual FIN flag. This is also a sign of an alert.
Although finding deviations has been an effective ap proach for a long time, yet we notice that certain abnormal behavior can only be identified when the executions of one or more protocols and services are collectively tracked and related. Our design can reveal more behavior signatures than conventional approaches that only focus on individual proto col. In the above example, if we tracked the execution of the Packet stream (fi'om Gateway)
Cross-layer Triggering ----� Attack Assessment TFTP session alone, it would not exhibit any unexpected behavior. However, for an RPC server, if we correlate the activities of RPC and TFTP sessions, it would clearly be unusual if the RPC server established a TFTP session with its RPC client (i.e., the attacker) or with any other ho � ts. Such behavior is considered as an indication of abnormahty. From a transport protocol or service perspective, individual deviated activities may be subtle or normal when observed alone; however, when these deviations are collectively tracked and related; the signs of an attack should stand out. Based on the observation that almost all vulnerability exploit attacks exhibit one or more distinctive deviated b � �a vior patterns or attack symptoms to progress vul ? erabilIo/ exploitation, we propose an attack symptom trackmg . archI tecture and attack profiling method. Through observatIOns of a sufficient number of attack symptoms, the intrusion detec tion system than infers the likelihood of possible attacks.
We believe that behavior-based intrusion detection tech niques will be effective for coping with the challenges of detecting future stealthy and new attacks. The advantage of being able to identify the behavior signatures exhibited by different classes of attacks is that it is not necessary to know the specifics of an attack a priori. This is important because evading a behavior signature requires a fundamental be�� vior change in an attack ' s service invocation and vulnerabIlI ty exploitation, not just its network footprint. Changin � fun damental attack behavior would be much more challengmg.
A number of works have modeled the vulnerability beha vior of host-based intrusion detection. In [10], Shield uses state machines to define vulnerability-specific signatures by payload characteristics that lead to any remote exploits of the vulnerability. For unknown vulnerability attack detection, a follow-up work, ShieldGen [11] generates signatures by ana lyzing zero-day attacks, � onstructing n � w p otential a�tack instances (probes) and testmg the probes m vIrtual machl I� es. Most of the time, the vulnerability needs to be well-studIed, and the result cannot be used by other vulnerabilities. In [18] , it demonstrates the theory and an automatic vulnerability signature generation algorithm with a sample exploit.
III. INTRUSION DETECTION BY ATTACK SYMPTOMS
Adopting the attack symptom property, . we p � opose an . at tack symptom tracking system for robust mtrusIOn detectIOn that is based on a multilevel, finite-state machine (FSM).
A. Multilevel Behavior Tracking and Correlation
Most methods use simple events or statistics to describe abnormal behavior [4] [9] [12] . However, in the Blaster at tack shown in Fig. 1 , certain deviated behavior can only be recognized by collectively observing activities between the attacker and the victim hosts. We observe that attacks usually involve several aspects of activities in the communication protocol, service/application and the service model (e. ? , client-server or P2P). In the proposed system, the securIty status of communications is monitored by finite state ma chine on three levels: transport, service, and attack symptom. Fig. 2 shows the architecture of our multilevel inference model for behavior tracking and correlation, and the progres sive inference model. The FSMs at the transport and service levels are designed to track both normal and abnormal beha viors in the transport and service states of network connec tions and service sessions. The top-level activity tracking is accomplished by attack symptom FSMs, which model . h�gh level abstractions of abnormal behavior. The state tranSItIOns of the attack symptom FSMs are based on the observations and correlations of the states in the lower two levels.
Attacks are assessed based on observations of the attack symptoms exhibited by communicating hosts. Three logical entities, flows, connections, and associations are used to monitor ' and correlate the communication relationships be tween hosts. Packets are first classified into unidirectional flows based on a 5-tuple: source IP, destination IP, protocol, source port, and destination port. A connection refers to two unidirectional flows with the same protocol, but with the source and destination addresses and ports interchanged, e.g., a TCP connection consists of two unidirectional flows. An association is a set of relevant flows established in the con text of an instance of a network service. The classification of flows into associations is based on knowledge of the services, e.g., an FTP application may have one control connection and zero or more data connections.
Some works use FSMs to monitor network activities. NetSTAT [13] employs state transition diagrams to model general network state changes or events (e.g., active connec tions, interactions states, network topology and configura tions) to represent known attack scenarios. However, the authors need to specify the state transition diagrams based on their experience for effective intrusion detection. In some intrusion detection systems, FSMs are also used to record the state of the network to enhance intrusion detection. For ex ample, in Bro [14] , some policies incorporate state informa tion to specify throttling rules on traffic flows, rules for alert ing security-related events, and signatures for known atta � ks and vulnerabilities. In contrast, we use the state machme techniques to identify distinctive behavioral deviations exhibited during the compromising phase of attacks. We explain how we construct these FSMs later in the article.
B. Attack Assessment
Each attack symptom reflects a particular distinctive anomalous behavior pattern exhibited by some malware at tacks. The assessment of attacks progresses as more attack symptoms are observed. We use a probabilistic inference model to infer and compute the belief score of possible at tacks, known or unknown, based on observations of the at tack symptoms. There are two important reasons for employ ing the model. First, each attack, simple or sophisticated, will exhibit one or more attack symptoms. Each attack symptom has a different degree of significance in the attack evaluation. Some attack symptoms are considered more important than others, depending on the role of the corresponding activity executed in the attack, and whether it could be avoided, or modified. Second, since future attacks are likely to become stealthier in order to outwit current intrusion detection sys tems, it is important that detection of future unknown attacks should not rely on single or individual observations. Hence, each attack symptom is associated with a probability value to represent its anomaly level in attacks.
Conditional joint probabilities are adopted to calculate the aggregate probability when a number of attack symptoms are observed. Thus, the model provides network administra tors with a meaningful way to assess information about the confidence scores of suspected attacks. Let random variables Sq], Sqb .. . , Sqn represent the 1st to nth attack symptom o� served. The assessment of the likelihood (A) that how POSSI ble attack is taking place is computed as follows:
A�k =P(Ak ISql'Sq2, ... ,SqJ n traces is used to compute these values. The threshold of A depends on network configuration. In this paper, we do � ot specifically set a fix value for A; rather we observe the lil crement of A when each attack symptom is observed. The value of A is computed and shown in evaluation section. The details about probability operations, quantifying conditional probabilities, and probability independency issues can be found in probability reasoning textbook, such as [21] .
IV. PROFILING ATTACKS
The construction of attack symptom FSM involves the following four steps.
1) Construct Protocol and Service FSMs
Since the states of attack symptoms represent temporal and semantic summarization of the anomalies tracked by the service and transport FSMs, we first construct protocol and service FSMs based on the standard specifications and/or the de facto implementations. Each FSM models the interaction procedures of the associated protocol/service between com municating hosts, and the definitions and formats of the mes sages exchanged. It is particularly imperative to model what action should be taken when these FSMs receive unexpected packets so to identify possible deviated activities in the asso ciated protocol or service. For service-level FSMs, the com munication model, such as simple one-tier client-server, peer-to-peer, three-tier client-server communication para digm, is also taken into account. This is crucial for describ ing the characteristic interaction behavior between commu nicating hosts as well. The other essential features modeled include: the number of connections established, who initiates each connection, whether fixed or random ports are used, and the time intervals between the connections. P(Sq) I Ak)II P(Sqi I Sqi_),···,Sql'Ak) � -2 P(Ak) p(Sq) II P(Sqj I Sqj_l' ... ,Sq) j �2
We simply manually construct these FSMs. Take TCP (1) [22] for example, we first identify all possible messages in this protocol based on the TCP Header Format. For TCP, the 6-bit Control Bits are used to differentiate different messages. We also add a message called "unknown"; in case we reFor the simplicity of computing conditional probability table, we assume the observation of attack symptom is Mar kovian. Namely the probability of the next attack symptom depends only upon the present one. If we take this Marko vian assumption, we can rewrite (1) to (2) . Although such an assumption may cause the value of A be overestimated or underestimated when n > 2, yet maintaining the conditional probability table of (1) may not be practical. In practice, we can combine related behavior into one attack symptom to make sure the behavior of each attack symptom is as inde pendent as possible to mitigate the problem of overestima tion and underestimation. 
In this inference model, the information of P(Sq] = S x I Ak), P(Sqi = Sy I Sqi_l =s x , Ak), P(Sqi = Sy I Sqi-l = Sx) and peAk) / P(Sq I = Sx) are required in prior (where Sx and Sy are attack symptoms). A statistical approach based on real world traffic 168 ceive a message that is not defined in the protocol specifica tion. Then we identify the states of this protocol based on the TCP Connection State Diagram provided in [22] . Then, the transitions are linked between these states. We also add sev eral additional states for error handling mechanism so that the FSM can transit to one of the error state if unexpected messages or undefined messages are received. All protocol and service FSMs are constructed in such way.
The construction of these FSMs can be a training-testing approach by collecting real-world traffic traces to build the model of FSM. We are now investigating a semi-automatic approach to generate protocol and service FSMs. However, such approach is beyond this paper ' s scope.
2) Collect Complete Attack Traces
The goal of this step is to discover the tactics and me thods (procedures) used in an attack, and identify the distinct abnormal activities that are crucial and unique to the attack. Note that a complete trace of raw packets exchanged be tween the attacker and the victim(s) is necessary to gain a complete understanding of the "communication context" (both normal and abnormal) of an attack at the transport and service levels. This is because certain clues about abnormal signature (attack) behavior are hidden in the traces, which are not usually reported in attack whitepapers. Examples of such clues includes 1) what additional connections have been created; 2) why, in addition to the targeted vulnerable service session, the attacker needs another connection to complete the exploitation (e.g., downloading malware code); and 3) what unexpected activities and packet exchanges have oc curred. The information is important for understanding and analyzing deviated activities in previous attacks.
3) Find Deviated Execution Paths
Attack traces are fed to the corresponding transport and service FSMs to analyze deviated execution paths and de termine how frequently they occur. One way to perform this task is to use the training and testing techniques. We first calculate the occurrence frequency of each state and transi tion path by training the system with packet traces that do not contain attacks. Then, we use the attack traces to com pare the occurrence frequencies with those derived in the training set. As a result, the distinctive deviated execution paths taken by attacks can be identified. (In [21] , it also de scribes the details of counting process.) 4) Construct Attack Symptoms After collecting the deviated execution paths in the pro tocol and service FSMs identified for each attack, we can construct attack symptom FSMs. Since attack symptoms represent a temporal, semantic summarization of the anoma lies tracked by the service and transport FSMs, the state tran sitions of attack symptom FSMs are driven by the transitions of one or more protocol and/or service FSMs. Every (de viated and normal) state transition of the underlying FSMs is extracted as an event of upper layer attack symptom FSM. In the meantime, a temporal state of the attack symptom FSM is also created. We then concatenate all new events and states along with the time that they occur to construct the attack symptom FSM. Such an attack symptom FSM is the profile of the attack. Note that human expert may need to split the entire attack behavior into smaller pieces by their time of occurrence. Fig. 3 shows one of the attack symptom of Blas ter named "Forced session termination", whose state transi tio�s are driven by the events occurred and the states reached of the TCP and RPC. At this time, a network expert can ma nually fine-tune the attack symptom FSM by removing some events or states that can considered irrelevant to the attack.
469
For example, TCP three-way hand sharking process may be irrelevant to the Blaster attack so that we can replace the three-state process by a state "TCP ESTABLISHED" in the attack symptom FSM or we can even remove it.
Then a State Correlation Matrix R is used to describe the relationship between transport/service FSMs and attack symptom FSMs. The value of the element Ri.j is either null or a two-tuple <state m of TSi, a list of <event e of Sj», which indicates that the reach of state m of TSi triggers the creation of (one or more) event e to the attack symptom Sj. This ma trix specifies how attack symptoms transit based on the state changes of transport and service FSMs. An example is Ri.j = <state "BINDING" of RPC FSM, event "RPC-BINDING" of "F orced session termination"», which means the reach of state "BINDING" of RPC FSM will trigger the creation of an event "RPC-BINDING" to the "Forced session termina tion" attack symptom.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We implemented a prototype system, called Gestalt, on a PC-based Linux platform. The name "Gestalt" is used to emphasize the "wholeness" principle in robust detection of future vulnerability-exploit attacks. The objective is to dep loy the system at the gateway router of a network to capture packets between the protected network and the Internet.
In the first experiment, we analyzed 6 attack traces using the proposed attack symptom profiling method. As we men tioned in previous section, the complete attack trace is needed to capture the behavior of the attack so we collect the execution files of the malware from the Internet and repro duce these attacks in the laboratory. Although there are some tools, such as honyd [23] , for collecting the execution file of the attack, it is still not easy to collect unknown malware and non-alive malware form the Internet. Unknown attacks may not be identified by these tools, and non-alive malware can only be found in the laboratory or archive, which may not be public available or the execution file is modified to be harm less. In this experiment, we collect six execution files of the malware, and then execute them in a controlled environment, log the packets exchanged between attacker and victims, and study the malware behavior to ensure all the attack behavior are logged. Table I presents the results. Although these at tacks were discovered in different years and targeted differ ent service vulnerabilities, they exhibited and shared certain characteristic abnormal behavior, because they adopted common attack methods and procedures. Usually, attacks have three phases: probing, compromising, and propagating. As [15] mentioned, the probing and propagating phases are easily disguised. However, in order to control the victim, exploiting the vulnerability is necessary. In Table I , we can see there are certain common consequences after/while ex ploiting a service, such as abnormal message order, er ror/incorrect format message, and abnormal state transitions. They are the entry point that attacker enter the victim. Usual ly, the compromised server does not know how to normally reply the malicious request, thus "Forced session termina tion" often occurs. The service timeout mechanism of TCP would forcedly terminate the no-response service. Further more, exploited vulnerable servers may need another mali- cious executable file for latter use, so they may act like a client to download file from the attacker. These attack symp toms are captured in our experiment.
In the second experiment, we conducted preliminary ex periments to determinate how different intrusion detection approaches handle stealthy and unknown attacks. Specifical ly, we compared Gestalt with the content-signature-based and anomaly-based techniques implemented in Snort and Bro, two popular intrusion detection systems. We modify Blaster source code to generate its polymorphic and two stealthy variants (slow scan and selective scan) to demon strate the detection capability of each detection approaches. For unknown attacks, we used Sasser, a buffer overflow at tack. We explicitly removed the knowledge about Sasser and retained all the other rules and policies in Snort and Bro. Table II shows the attack symptoms detected by Gestalt and their associated belief scores, as well as the alerts triggered by the other two systems. All the experiments were con ducted in a controlled LAN. The unpatched operating sys tems and services were installed, and the packets exchanged were logged by Wireshark [16] . Note that the experiment 170 shown in Table II does not observe any "Flooding" (B6), because Blaster only does flooding in specific date. However, we still list the belief score with and without "Flooding".
The results show that, the polymorphism does evade the content-signature-based approach; the corresponding rules do not be effective. In Snort, the content-signature-based alerts (Clo C2) are not triggered in this case. Since polymor phism only changes the appearance of attack packets and does not affect the attack procedure or behavior, Gestalt ' s behavior-based approach successfully detects the attack with belief score of 0.6547. The score is raised from 0.0023(BI) ' 0.5079(B2) ' 0.6049(B3), 0.6l60(B4) until 0.6547(Bs). The results also demonstrate that adopting stealthy scanning strategies is effective, but not good enough. For slow scans, all the scanning-related alerts (Blo C4, and AI) are still trig gered, though far later (in 2.9554, 92.4930, and 1l0.5 seconds, respectively) than original case « 0.0001 seconds). Gestalt can still detect the other the four attack symptoms with no delay, as in the original Blaster. For the case of se lective scans, all the scanning-related detection rules (B lo C4, and AI) fail. Even so, Gestalt still captures the other four attack symptoms with a final belief score of 0.4914. If "SYN-flooding" (B6) is observed, than the score is 0.6283. We show that behavior-based approach indeed has the poten tial to resist the sophisticated evasion techniques.
For the unknown attack, it is evident that content signature and behavior based techniques cannot detect this unknown attack using existing rules, except the scans. Ges talt successfully detects the "unknown" attack, Sasser, by identifying the attack symptoms (B3, B4, and B5) with a be lief score of 0.7124 (or 0.9109 if B6 is observed). Since at tackers may take similar intrusion procedure, Gestalt can take such advantages having potential to detect unknown anomalies. New attack symptoms can also be identified by finding deviated protocol/service behavior. We observed a new attack symptom "Null-TCP-connection", which is a TCP connection without carrying any application layer mes sage. We guess it is a probe to test if a server is active or not.
In the third experiment, we demonstrate the power of multiple attack symptoms. In Gestalt, intrusion detection is not based on a single symptom of abnormal behavior, but rather on progressive inference and the correlation of a set of attack symptoms. Table III shows the number of occurrences of six attack symptoms found in the trace we collected from a campus core network. It contains more than 45 million flows and 680 million raw packets. Clearly, probing and flooding attack symptoms are quite common in the network; however, the occurrences of the other four symptoms are significantly rare. Although "TCP-portsweep" and "SYN flooding" seems to be malicious, they may be caused by normal applications. Therefore, we can check them with the following attack symptoms. Table III also shows the number of consecutive occurrences of two attack symptoms. The observation of consecutive attack symptoms enables the be havior-based approach to achieve a better attack assessment result with few false alarms, compared to only observing individual symptoms. Actually, in this network, there has no attack, so the number of total false positives is only 31+3+3. The false positive rate is quite low considering there are total nearly one million attack symptoms observed.
VI. CONCLUSION
As attacks continue to evolve, there is an urgent need to develop detection mechanisms that are robust to attack evasion strategies. To this end, we propose Gestalt, an attack behavior profiling and inference system. It focuses on cap turing behavior across multiple levels to reveal more anoma lies. Multilevel FSM-based network state tracking and corre lation architecture in conjunction with a probabilistic infe rence model are presented in the paper. Our preliminary ex periment results show that the proposed approach can signif icantly reduce the false positives by considering a sequence of anomalous observations collectively rather than in isola tion. And even sophisticated attack variants can be detected. Gestalt is thus a promising alternative to existing content signature-based and anomaly detection techniques. Future works may include automatically generating protocol FSMs and the attack symptoms, and the notion of normality can be extended to other aspects; not restrict to protocol and service execution. Experiments on other network environment, zero day attacks and an evaluation of the true positives can be a further study of this work.
